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Bankruptcy Procedures for Sovereigns: 
A History of Ideas, 1976–2001
KENNETH ROGOFF and JEROMIN ZETTELMEYER*
This paper describes the evolution of ideas to apply bankruptcy reorganization
principles to sovereign debt crises. Our focus is on policy proposals between the
late 1970s and Anne Krueger’s (2001) proposed “Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Mechanism,” with brief reference to the economics literature on sovereign debt.
We  describe the perceived inefficiencies that motivate proposals, and how
proposals seek to change debtor and creditor incentives. We find that there has
been a moving consensus on what constitutes the underlying problem, but not on
how to fix it. The range of proposed approaches remains broad and only recently
shows some signs of narrowing. [JEL B290, B300, F020]
I
MF First Deputy Managing Director Anne Krueger’s recent proposal to create a
“Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism” has triggered a new debate about
procedures, based either on statutes, private contracts, or official policies, that would
apply bankruptcy reorganization principles to the resolution of sovereign debt
crises.1 As is widely known, this debate has some predecessors, particularly during
1995–96 and 2000–01, beginning with an influential speech by Jeffrey Sachs (1995)
*Kenneth Rogoff is the IMF’s Economic Counselor and Director of Research. Jeromin Zettelmeyer
is a Senior Economist in the IMF Research Department. This paper extends and supersedes an earlier
paper, entitled “Early Ideas on Sovereign Bankruptcy: A Survey” (IMF Working Paper WP/02/57, March
2002). We thank, without implication, Lewis Alexander, Mark Allen, Jim Boughton, Eduardo Borensztein,
Benjamin Cohen, William Cline, Barry Eichengreen, Jonathan Fried, Sergio Galvis, Sean Hagan, Andy
Haldane, Olivier Jeanne, Adam Lerrick, Thomas Laryea, Ashoka Mody, Lex Rieffel, Christoph
Rosenberg, Richard Portes, Jeffrey Sachs, Steven Schwarcz, Rupert Thorne, Hung Tran, and an anony-
mous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. Priya Joshi provided outstanding research assistance.
1See Krueger (2001, 2002), Taylor (2002), Buchanan (2002), EMTA (2002), IIF (2001, 2002), Lerrick
and Meltzer (2002), Miller (2002), Pettifor (2002), Porzecanski (2002), Raffer (2002), Roubini (2002),
Truman (2001), White (2002), Financial Times, 4/4/2002, p. 24 and The Economist, 4/6/2002, pp. 14 and 82.
For a broader recent discussion on alternative approaches to deal with financial crises,see Eichengreen (2002).in the aftermath of the Mexican crisis. What is less known is that the post-Mexico
debate was itself preceded by a steady stream of proposals beginning even prior to
the 1980s debt crisis, which contained many of the ideas put forward since 1995.
This paper describes the evolution of this literature from the late 1970s until
2001, with particular emphasis on the early literature. Our starting point reflects
the earliest postwar contributions on the subject: prior to the 1970s, with very little
private lending to developing countries and no debt crises involving the private
sector, the subject of sovereign bankruptcy received little attention.2 Since our
objective is to survey the intellectual history of the current debate rather than this
debate itself, which has been rapidly evolving in recent months, we end the survey
just prior to the Krueger (2001) speech and the contributions that follow. However,
we briefly return to the current debate in the conclusions.
We restrict the survey in two ways. First, our focus is on policy proposals. The
formal economics literature on sovereign debt, which begins with contributions by
Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and D. Cohen and Sachs (1982), is discussed only to
the extent that it sheds light either on the inefficiencies that the policy proposals
are concerned with, or on the potential limitations of some proposals. Second,
within the set of policy proposals, we concentrate on ideas to deal with sovereign
insolvency through a structured arbitration or negotiation process between credi-
tors and the debtor, often based on the analogy with domestic bankruptcy organi-
zation (e.g., Chapter 11 of the U.S. bankruptcy code). This implies, in particular,
that two major policy initiatives to resolve the debt crisis of the 1980s are only
referred to in passing, namely market-based mechanisms for debt reduction, and
ideas to create an official “International Debt Facility” that would buy privately
held debt at discounted prices and subsequently offer debtors some degree of
relief. Both have been expertly surveyed elsewhere.3
We approach the subject by asking two questions. First, what are the assumed
inefficiencies which the various proposals are trying to address? Second, how would
the proposals change incentives in a way that addresses these inefficiencies, if at all?
As we shall see, there is a clear historical progression with regard to the first ques-
tion. From the late 1970s to the early 1990s, the emphasis was mostly on inefficient
debt workouts due to free riding by individual creditors. Beginning in 1995, this is
extended by two additional concerns: addressing self-fulfilling debt crises, and
avoiding the moral hazard problem associated with large IMF-led bailouts. 
On the second question, however—how to influence creditor and debtor
incentives—the progression is less obvious. To be sure, from the late 1970s until
about 1995, the range of approaches that were put forward to deal with the
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2There were extensive discussions of the legal and economic aspects of sovereign debt crises prior to
World War II (see Manes, 1918; Borchard and Wynne, 1951; and Malagardis, 1990 for a survey). The idea
of applying bankruptcy principles to sovereigns goes back to at least Adam Smith, who wrote: “When it
becomes necessary for a state to declare itself bankrupt, in the same manner as when it becomes neces-
sary for an individual to do so, a fair, open and avowed bankruptcy is always the measure which is both
least dishonourable to the debtor, and least hurtful to the creditor” (cited from page 883 of the 1937
edition; pages 564–65 of the 1776 edition).
3See Cline (1995), and references in Section II below. The “International Debt Facility” goes back to
proposals by Kenen (1983) and Rohatyn (1983).sovereign bankruptcy problem steadily expanded, moving from sketchy ideas on
international cooperation to more complete and concrete statutory proposals, and
finally the suggestion to focus on debtor-creditor contracts rather than new insti-
tutions. Until the end of 2001, however, there is not much of a trend—in the sense
of either a movement toward consensus, or a “moving consensus”—to speak of.
Only the most recent, 2002 round of the debate shows some signs of narrowing
between the main proposals.
I. From the Late 1970s to Oechsli (1981)
Several years before the 1980s debt crisis, rapidly growing developing country
debt, crises in Zaïre and Peru, and finally the “specter of widespread defaults by
LDCs” (Oechsli, 1981) prompted calls for better creditor coordination and the
development of a formal restructuring process for international debt.4 The first
policy initiative along these lines appears to be the proposal to create an
“International Debt Commission” put forward by the Group of 77 developing
countries during a meeting in Arusha in February of 1979, in preparation for the
fifth United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in Manila in June of
the same year. The Debt Commission would consist of “eminent public figures
with recognized knowledge and experience of debt problems and economic devel-
opment. Any interested developing country which believes it has, or may have a
debt problem could address itself to the Commission. The commission will: (i)
Examine the debt and development problems of the requesting country; (ii) In the
light of such examination ... make recommendations on measures required to deal
with the debt problem in the broader context of development including measures
of debt reorganization and additional bilateral and multilateral finance; (iii)
Convene a meeting of all parties concerned with a view to implementing the
recommendations under (ii) above” (Group of 77, 1979, p. 157).
Although the “International Debt Commission” never materialized because of
resistance from the creditor countries—and in any event would not have had
powers other than making recommendations—the Arusha Programme foreshad-
owed several aspects of subsequent proposals for an international bankruptcy
mechanism. These include the “debt reorganization” objective, the desire to coor-
dinate all parties, a role for a neutral arbiter or mediator, and the emphasis on new
financing. This said, it appears that the primary objective of the G-77 was to make
debt negotiations with official creditors more debtor friendly compared to the
Paris Club framework,5 rather than addressing an inefficiency under the status
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4The earliest modern reference we could find on the desirability of a bankruptcy procedure for countries
is Ohlin (1976), who argues that “development finance needs something like the institution of ‘honourable
bankruptcy’ ... to enable the credit system to work without too much risk aversion and to recover quickly
from failures. The option of bankruptcy would prevent the machinery from getting clogged up by a lot of
dead debt” (p. 220). Similar statements were made at hearings on developing country debt servicing prob-
lems conducted by the U.S. Congress during the late 1970s (see, for example, Philipp Wellons in U.S. House
of Representatives (1977), p. 43). On the Peru restructuring case, see Stallings (1979) and Cline (1981); on
Zaïre see Aronson (1979). Oechsli (1981) contains summaries of both cases.
5See Rieffel (1985), p. 24, and paragraphs 48–61 in UNCTAD (1981).quo. In particular, neither the Arusha Programme itself nor a subsequent back-
ground report by the UNCTAD secretariat (UNCTAD, 1981) refer to problems
caused by private creditors, or poor coordination among creditor groups.
The credit for the first proposal that invokes the Chapter 11 analogy and is
explicitly motivated by problems of this kind goes to Christopher Oechsli (1981):
“Many of the procedures set forth in Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978 for rehabilitating financially troubled businesses can be applied profitably to
renegotiation of LDC debt” (p. 354). Of these procedures, Oechsli emphasizes
three: a creditor committee, an independent “examiner, a monitoring party which
does not displace the debtor from control of its business,” and a formal initiation
procedure. Oechsli believes the monitor could be the IMF, but stresses the need for
“inclusion of the debtor in the formulation process” of a restructuring plan. The
initiation procedure should allow either creditors or debtors to take the initial step,
although “creditors and the IMF need not accept the debtor LDC’s formal petition.”
According to Oechsli, sovereign debt restructuring under the status quo suffers
from several problems. Negotiations take too long, and their outcome is too uncer-
tain, harming the debtor and delaying the rehabilitation process. Moreover, they
may be insufficiently focused on “an LDC’s basic development as the means to
strengthen the country’s credit and debt service capacity” (p. 329). In Oechsli’s
view, this is due to the “lack of an established procedure” and poor creditor coor-
dination. By the latter, he seems to mean primarily a lack of coordination between
classes of creditors negotiating separately—in particular, the private and official
sectors—rather than across individual private creditors. In response, he proposes
“an established procedural framework for debt renegotiation” that includes “all
major official and commercial creditors in a comprehensive response. The proce-
dure should avoid the long delays ... which result from separate renegotiations by
different types of creditors.” In particular, “the commercial creditors would not
have to delay their reaction to the LDC debt problem until after the completion of
the official creditor club negotiations” (p. 329).
Although he contemplates the creation of a “court-like entity” as a possibility,
stating that “the IMF would seem the obvious choice for that role,” Oechsli
concludes that this is unnecessary. “Alternatively, creditors could specify binding
arbitration procedures in their loan contracts” (including an arbitration entity
along the lines of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes). “Neither, however, is necessary for Chapter 11 procedures to be applied
successfully in the renegotiation context. Establishment of a renegotiation plan
could continue to be by the agreement and consensus of the parties, and not by
imposition from some international institution” (p. 333).
In short, in spite of invoking the Chapter 11 analogy, Oechsli seems to implic-
itly attribute the inefficiencies associated with debt renegotiation to shortcomings
in the official sector’s approach, rather than collective action problems among
private creditors. He does not discuss provisions for dealing with free riding within
the private sector such as declaring a standstill, or imposing a majority-approved
agreement on dissenting creditors. A Chapter 11-like procedure is important to
him not as a solution of the free rider problem, but mainly because it provides a
predictable timetable and clear communications channels. 
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(debtor, private creditor, and official creditor), and his insistence that the uncer-
tainty about the timing and nature of the official response can complicate nego-
tiations between debtor countries and private creditors was farsighted, and
arguably borne out during the debt crisis.6 Moreover, the three-way negotiation
framework, formalized a few years later by Bulow and Rogoff (1988a), proved
useful not only in understanding the ex post inefficiencies that Oechsli was
concerned with, but also in analyzing the potential moral hazard problem ex
ante facing creditor country governments and international financial institu-
tions.7 As we shall see below, this developed into one of the principal argu-
ments for a sovereign bankruptcy procedure in the debate that followed the
1995 Mexican crisis. 
II. Developments During the Debt Crisis
Oechsli’s proposal does not seem to have become widely known outside a
narrow legal literature. Ironically, the 1980s debt crisis itself initially seemed to
stifle rather than inspire similar ideas, perhaps because the debate about strate-
gies for resolving the  debt crisis—including market-based debt reduction
schemes, plans for a new “International Debt Facility” or “International Debt
Discount Corporation”—that would centralize private debt in public hands, and
finally the Brady plan, crowded out loftier proposals on international bankruptcy
reorganization.8 However, there were important exceptions as early as 1984, and
by the time the debt crisis ended in the early 1990s, several proposals had been
put forward that went significantly beyond Oechsli’s contribution both in terms
of motivation and in their statutory implications. In addition, some contributions
explored the question to what extent Oechsli-style sovereign bankruptcy proce-
dures could be supported by the existing institutional framework, in particular,
the IMF’s Articles of Agreement. Finally, the 1980s were exceptionally fertile in
improving the understanding of why sovereign debt might create problems that
could not necessarily be dealt with by market forces, current institutions, or one-
off policy measures. Beginning with the latter, we now survey these develop-
ments in turn.
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6Bulow and Rogoff (1990) argue that “far from speeding compromise, the presence of official credi-
tors has tended to ossify the negotiating position of the banks and countries” (p. 35). Dooley (1994) and
Eichengreen and Portes (1995) make similar points. The IMF’s policy of “lending into arrears,” which was
formally adopted in 1989, can be viewed as a response to that problem (see next section for details). 
7In the Bulow and Rogoff (1988a) framework, knowledge that creditor country governments have a
stake in the continued smooth flow of trade, and no way to credibly stay out of debt rescheduling negoti-
ations, leads private creditors to charge lower risk premia to sovereigns than they might otherwise. Related
papers using a similar bargaining-theoretic approach include Wells (1993), Bhattacharya and Detragiache
(1994), and Klimenko (2001). On moral hazard related to international bailouts, see Jeanne and
Zettelmeyer (2001), and for three recent empirical papers that attempt to test for moral hazard, Lane and
Phillips (2000), Dell’Ariccia, Gödde, and Zettelmeyer (2000), and Kamin (2001).
8For an overview, see Cline (1995), pp. 205–31. For analyses of the International Debt Facility, see
Corden (1989) and Kenen (1990).A Better Understanding of the Problem
Collective action problems and the Allied Bank case
A milestone in understanding what inefficiencies might justify a centralized reso-
lution to sovereign debt crises was Jeffrey Sachs’s influential 1984 Princeton Study,
“Theoretical Issues in International Borrowing.” Sachs’s paper, which extended
earlier work with Daniel Cohen (D. Cohen and Sachs, 1982), presents a simple,
formal statement of some of the collective action problems associated with inter-
national debt—both self-fulfilling debt crises, and free rider problems in the context
of debt rescheduling or restructuring.9 Citing evidence from Cline (1981) on Peru,
and data on a 1983 rescheduling of loans to Brazil, Sachs argues that “even in bank
syndicates significant free rider problems remain” (Sachs, 1984, p. 33).
A 1985 court decision, Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola de
Cartago,w as widely viewed as illustrating both the possibility that a single cred-
itor might “hold out,” and the tenuous nature of protections against the claims of
such a creditor. In 1981, Costa Rica had suspended debt payments to a 39-member
bank syndicate. A restructuring agreement was subsequently reached with all cred-
itors but one, Fidelity Union Trust of New Jersey, which sued through an agent,
Allied Bank. In 1984, a U.S. Court of Appeals initially upheld a lower court ruling
in favor of three Costa Rican banks that had acted on behalf of Costa Rica, arguing
that “Costa Rica’s prohibition of payments of its external debt is analogous to the
reorganization of a business pursuant to Chapter 11 of our Bankruptcy Code ...
Costa Rica’s prohibition of payment of debt was not a repudiation of the debt but
rather was merely a deferral of payments while it attempted in good faith to rene-
gotiate its obligations.” Upon rehearing the case in March 1985, however, the court
reversed itself after the U.S. Department of Justice argued that contrary to the
court’s initial assumptions, the U.S. government did not agree with “Costa Rica’s
attempted unilateral restructuring,” but instead supported an IMF-guided renegoti-
ation procedure, “grounded in the understanding that while parties may agree to
renegotiate conditions of payment, the underlying obligations to pay nevertheless
remain valid and enforceable.”10 In the end, the court ruled that “The Costa Rican
government’s unilateral attempt to repudiate private, commercial obligations is
inconsistent with the orderly resolution of international debt problems.”11
While the case was subsequently settled, the March 1985 ruling made it clear
that in the United States, Chapter 11-style protections did not apply to sovereigns,
as noted and lamented by Dell (1985) and many others writing at that time. For
example, Sachs (1986a) tersely observes: “Individually, these creditors have an
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9In a domestic context, self-fulfilling runs on banks were first modeled by Bryant (1980) and
Diamond and Dybvig (1983). As we note later, in more recent theories there is no longer a sharp distinc-
tion between self-fulfilling crises and crises driven by fundamentals.
10In addition, the U.S. Department of Justice brief argued that New York would suffer as a finan-
cial center if lenders could not enforce contracts (see Eichengreen and Portes, 1995, p. 60). This illus-
trates a potential problem with reforming sovereign bankruptcy procedures by changing the law in
major creditor countries, namely that financial centers that make their laws more debtor-friendly might
lose business to centers that do not. This problem is avoided by statutory proposals that focus on
changes at the international level.
11757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985), Dell (1985), Greenwood and Mercer (1995), Laryea (2002).incentive to call in their claims against the overextended debtor countries, even if
doing so injures the economic performance of the debtor so much that the credi-
tors suffer collectively. Preventing such a destructive race to liquidate assets is one
of the major purposes of a bankruptcy code, which restricts the ability of indi-
vidual creditors to act against the group interest. Unfortunately, countries cannot
file for Chapter 11 protection” (p. 418).12
This said, the Allied Bank case also illustrated the tension between addressing
the collective action problem and maintaining creditor rights, which is characteristic
of the debate today. While the case was initiated by a single holdout, it would be
incorrect to interpret it as a straightforward conflict of interests between that holdout
and the remaining creditors. Although they had settled with Costa Rica, the other
creditors did not object to the litigation. On the contrary, through the New York
Clearing House Association, they filed briefs strongly supporting the claim (see
Laryea, 2002). An explanation for this is that the whole creditor class—and indeed
future creditors—benefited from the principle that “while parties may agree to rene-
gotiate conditions of payment, the underlying obligations to pay nevertheless remain
valid and enforceable.” The vindication of this principle strengthens the position of
creditors in a voluntarily restructuring since they can negotiate from the position that
they are legally entitled to 100 percent recovery in accordance with the contract
terms. Thus, the lens of the collective action problem does not fully capture the basic
creditor-debtor conflict central to the Allied Bank case (and, indeed, many other
sovereign debt litigation cases).
Debt overhang and “market-based” debt reduction
A second major development in the mid-1980s was the recognition that high levels
of debt could lead to inefficiently low levels of growth because the need to repay
creditors acted like a tax on investment (the “debt overhang” problem). Taken to
the extreme, this implied that debt forgiveness might benefit not only debtors but
also creditors if the write-down of nominal claims was more than offset by an
increased likelihood that the country might repay its remaining debt.13 The debt
overhang argument was used to justify “market-based” debt reduction schemes, in
which the country itself took the initiative in reducing the debt stock by buying
back debt at discounted prices, swapping bank loans for local currency that had to
be invested in domestic equity (debt-equity swaps), or exchanging loans against
discounted “exit bonds” with lower principal or interest.14
Market-based schemes enjoyed considerable popularity in the late 1980s and
were tried in several countries (buybacks in Bolivia and Brazil, debt-equity swaps in
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, and exit bonds in Mexico and Argentina).15
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12See also Nitsch (1983), Suratgar (1984), Dell (1985), UNCTAD (1986), Sachs (1986b, c), Raffer
(1986, 1989), Frank (1987), Schäfer (1987), Kampffmeyer (1987), and Malagardis and Nitsch (1988).
13See Sachs (1986c), Krugman (1988, 1989), and a related contribution by Dooley (1986).
14See, in particular, Williamson (1988), who also argued that the case for market-based debt reduc-
tion mechanisms is somewhat broader than just the debt Laffer argument and Sachs (1986b), who advo-
cated debt-equity swaps on the basis of a debt overhang model.
15Cline (1995), pp. 212–15.However, they soon came under criticism from several angles. Some authors argued
that any efficiency gains from market-based solutions would mostly benefit credi-
tors, not debtors (Bulow and Rogoff, 1988b; Dooley, 1988, 1989; and Bulow and
Rogoff, 1991). In addition, it became clear that market-based schemes suffered from
a very similar free rider problem as unilateral debt forgiveness or negotiations with
uncoordinated creditors: participation in the scheme had the effect of increasing the
repayment probability to the holdouts that chose not to participate (Sachs, 1988).
Helpman (1989) showed that uncoordinated voluntary debt reduction will typically
be suboptimally low. Indeed, the pure market-based approach mostly failed to
achieve large-scale debt reduction and was eventually replaced by the Brady plan,
which combined some elements of the market-based approach with coordinated
negotiations and public sector funding.16
The costs of default and incentives to repay
Finally, an important intellectual development during the 1980s was the literature
on what deters countries from repudiating, that is, how sovereign debt can exist in
the first place. The link to proposals for a supranational bankruptcy regime is as
follows. While the presence of some kind of collective action problem seems neces-
sary to justify a Chapter 11-style procedure at the international level, it is not neces-
sarily sufficient. The reason is that the debtor may have the means to unilaterally
protect himself from some of these collective action problems, such as the debt
panics or creditor grab races described by Sachs (1984, 1986a), by declaring a
unilateral payments moratorium. 
Thus, to assess under what conditions Chapter 11-style “protections” may
nevertheless be necessary to achieve orderly debt restructuring, it is important to
understand why countries are generally reluctant to default or suspend payments
in the first place. The initial contribution in this area was Eaton and Gersovitz
(1981), who portray a world in which sovereign lending can take place even if
borrowers are truly immune to any direct actions by creditors in the event of
nonrepayment. What motivates borrowers to make any repayments in these
circumstances is a concern that they will lose their reputation in international
credit markets, and thereby lose future access for an extended period. In contrast,
D. Cohen and Sachs (1982) assume that if a borrower fails to make repayments, it
will suffer a loss that is proportional to output. Though they do not explicitly moti-
vate their analysis in terms of the legal rights of creditors, their framework is
easiest to reconcile with the view that the international legal structure governing
sovereign loans matters. In the reputational model, the international legal system
is assumed to have little or no bite on debtors anyway. Thus, introducing an inter-
national Chapter 11 would not necessarily have an impact, except perhaps to the
extent that it might mitigate the reputational loss of countries who “play by the
rules” when restructuring their debts. 
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16The basic idea of the Brady plan was to increase the certainty of servicing the residual claims,
including by collateralizing the principal with U.S. zero-coupon bonds, in return for some forgiveness on
the existing debt. For details, see Cline (1995), pp. 215–22.How seriously should one take the reputational model of sovereign debt?
Bulow and Rogoff (1989) dealt a blow to the pure reputational view, showing that
pure reputation-based debt is not sustainable under a broad range of assumptions,
unless the loss a country sustains by not repaying is much broader than just its
image in credit markets. However, reputational theories of default costs have
remained a hot topic of debate, and experienced something of a comeback in
recent years (see Cole and Kehoe, 1996; Wright, 2001; and Tomz, 2002). The
current consensus can be characterized as saying that reputation is important, but
reputational losses are not the only costs of default. There remains a question as
to what these costs exactly consist of, and how the introduction of a sovereign debt
restructuring procedure would make a difference in this regard. A potential answer
given in the legal literature (see Debevoise, 1984; and Barnett, Galvis, and
Gouraige, 1984, discussed below) is that even when there are few overseas assets
that creditors can attach, unilateral creditor suits could hamper or destroy the
prospect for orderly negotiations by triggering cross-default clauses (of course,
this still requires an argument of why the inability to reach a settlement is in itself
a bad thing). Another answer is that creditors might interfere with the ability of the
debtor country to obtain trade credit.17
In short, although the economics literature during the 1980s does not provide
any simple answers, it does suggest that the laissez-faire approach to international
debt crises does not generally result in efficient outcomes. In these circumstances,
an institutional framework governing sovereign debt workouts can improve
matters, although the extent to which it does so will depend on the exact nature of
default costs. In particular, the problem of helping defaulting countries later regain
normal access to international capital markets is likely to present itself in even the
most smoothly functioning debt workout mechanism.
Initiatives Within the Existing Statutory Framework
Aside from proposals that would have required modifications to either national
law or international treaties (see next section below), two policy initiatives during
the 1980s sought to facilitate the orderly resolution of debt crisis without formal
changes in statutes. The first was IMF lending into arrears, which first occurred in
the context of a stand-by arrangement with Bolivia in June 1986, and was formally
adopted as part of the IMF’s debt strategy in May 1989 (see Boughton, 2001,
pp. 485–98). The IMF’s prior policy had been to lend only if the projected balance
of payments needs of a country were fully financed. “Accumulation of arrears did
not count as financing.” This implied that “if bank creditors refused to reschedule
the country’s debts, the Fund would normally suspend access to its own money”
(Boughton, p. 477). 
Under the new policy, arrears to commercial banks were generally tolerated.
From the perspective of solving the collective action and incentive problems
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17This is already mentioned by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) as a potential punishment mechanism in
addition to loss of reputation. See also Kaletsky (1985), Alexander (1987), and D. Cohen (1991). For a
comprehensive recent study quantifying the impact of defaults on trade, see Rose (2002). associated with sovereign debt restructuring, this had two consequences. First, in
principle, debtors could now receive IMF support after a payments suspension,
while negotiations with creditors were in progress. This made the prospects of
declaring a unilateral moratorium less daunting and weakened the bargaining posi-
tion of private creditors, who were “no longer allowed to determine whether an
[IMF] arrangement would be approved” (Boughton, p. 498). Second, it gave the
IMF an instrument with which to exert leverage over a defaulting debtor.
Cooperative debtor behavior during its negotiation with commercial bank credi-
tors could be rewarded through lending into arrears.18 In 1998, the policy was
extended to include arrears to bondholders.
A second notable initiative during this period was the Debevoise (1984)
proposal to use Article VIII, Section 2 of the IMF Articles to extend legal protec-
tions to debtor countries declaring a unilateral payments moratorium. Article VIII,
Section 2 reads as follows:
a) “Subject to the provisions of Article VII, Section 3(b) and Article XIV, Section 2,
no member shall, without the approval of the Fund, impose restrictions on the
making of payments and transfers for current international transactions. 
b) “Exchange contracts which involve the currency of any member and which are
contrary to the exchange control regulations of that member maintained or
imposed consistently with this Agreement shall be unenforceable in the territo-
ries of any member. (...)”
Debevoise argues that past attempts to use Article VIII(2)(b) to stay creditor
enforcement against debtor countries were unsuccessful either because courts did
not regard the term “exchange contracts” as sufficiently broad to cover loan agree-
ments, or because “the defendant had not met its burden of demonstrating that the
currency regulations relied upon were ‘maintained or imposed consistently with the
Fund Agreement’.” Debevoise’s proposal is to “establish a deferral mechanism”
that exploits the IMF’s power, under Article VIII, Section 2(a), to approve exchange
restrictions. “A nation facing an unmanageable external debt profile would be
eligible in principle. Application would be made to the Fund.” Following an “expe-
dited appraisal of the applicant’s need for the deferral mechanism ... the Fund
would signify acceptance of an application by a formal decision of the Executive
Board. This decision would include a statement that the applicant’s exchange
restrictions, particularly those on the making of payments and transfers for certain
current international transactions, were maintained or imposed consistently with
the Fund Agreement” (pp. 63–64). To deal with the problem that courts might still
not recognize controls approved by the IMF, Debevoise suggests three alternative
avenues: domestic legislation “providing that in any case in which an Article
VIII(2)(b) issue is raised, a Fund decision involving the controls at issue will be
determinative,” making the IMF’s deferral authority part of the debt contract, and
finally, an authoritative, broad IMF interpretation of Article VIII(2)(b). 
The Debevoise proposal does not seem to have had practical consequences, even
though in January 1988 the IMF Legal Department did in fact propose, in an internal
report, “that consideration be given by the Executive Board to the adoption of an
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18See, for example, Haldane and M. Kruger (2001), p. 8.authoritative interpretation of Article VIII, Section 2(b).” The proposed interpreta-
tion included a broad definition of the term “exchange contract” to include any
“contract providing either for a payment or transfer of foreign exchange, or for an
international payment or transfer (that is, a payment between a resident and a
nonresident, or a transfer of funds from one country to another).”19 However, the
purpose of this broad interpretation was not to protect sovereigns during payments
suspensions, but rather to “promote more uniformity in the interpretation of Article
VIII, Section 2(b).”20 In any event, the Executive Board decided not pursue the issue.
But the notion that the IMF might use its powers under Article VIII, Section 2 to
“legalize” standstills proved popular, and periodically reappears in the literature.21
New Statutory Proposals
Although overshadowed by the policy debate on one-off initiatives to resolve the
debt crisis, the 1980s and early 1990s also witnessed a number of proposals for an
improved international bankruptcy regime that contain many ideas that were redis-
covered after the 1994–95 Mexican crisis. In the following, we focus on four
contributions by Barnett, Galvis, and Gouraige (1984), B. Cohen (1989a, b), Raffer
(1990), and Kaeser (1990), as well as some reactions to these authors.22
Barnett, Galvis, and Gouraige (1984) set out with an extensive legal analysis
of the expected consequences of a creditor suit in U.S. courts following a unilat-
eral debt payments moratorium. They conclude that “the legal limitations upon the
Bank’s suit against the foreign sovereign would pale in comparison to the practical
consequences of a unilateral suit.” In particular, a suit would “trigger cross default
clauses in virtually all the debtor’s other loan agreements, possibly precipitating
an avalanche of litigation and hampering coordinated attempts at recovery or rene-
gotiation of the debt” (p. 113). In other words, a suit would trigger “a race to the
courthouse” (p. 85). The authors then examine the feasibility of “a national level
response” to this problem, in which a stay of payments and litigation would be
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19IMF Legal Department (1988), p. 88. This and other unpublished IMF documents referenced in this
paper can be requested from the IMF archives under a March 1999 Executive Board decision to allow public
access to Executive Board documents that are more than five years old. For more information, see “Archives
of the International Monetary Fund: A Factsheet,” at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/archive.htm.
20In fact, the IMF Legal Department (1988) implied that the use of Article VIII in the manner
proposed by Debevoise might not be possible even under a broad interpretation of Section 2(b). According
to the Legal Department’s paper, payments moratoria would not qualify as a “restriction” under Section
2(a) since a government “cannot be understood to impose an exchange restriction on itself” (p. 48). By
the same logic, they would probably not qualify as “exchange control regulations” under Section 2(b). See
also IMF Legal Department (1995), pp. 6–7, and IMF Legal Department (1996), pp. 28–36.
21See, for example, Sachs (1988), p. 253, and Sachs (1995), p. 12, discussed below.
22Other early contributions include Suratgar (1984), who makes the Chapter 11 analogy and seems
the first to suggest that an orderly approach to sovereign bankruptcy may require imposing controls on all
capital flows, and Williamson (1985), who in general terms proposes a “quasi-judicial mechanism ... to
try to make operational the distinction between insolvency and illiquidity” and “award debt relief in the
former case while denying it in the latter.”A much later but apparently independent contribution is due to
Reinisch (1994), who is one of the few authors that cite Oechsli (1981), but does not seem to be aware of
the other major proposals put forward during the 1980s. Like Barnett, Galvis, and Gouraige, B. Cohen,
and Raffer, he calls for a new “independent international insolvency tribunal” established by treaty.imposed by presidential executive action, via the International Emergency Powers
Act used by President Carter to freeze Iranian assets in the U.S. Apart from consti-
tutional concerns, they find that this would raise jurisdictional problems and not
be suited to the international character of the problem. “Therefore, we must look
to institutional reforms at the international level,” including “the creation of an
adjunct to the IMF to handle debt problems on a unified, international basis.”
Barnett, Galvis, and Gouraige envisage a “supranational, multilateral body”
that would be “independent from the IMF both in administration and decision-
making.” Its powers would include the authority to (1) convene mandatory discus-
sions between a debtor state and its commercial bank creditors; (2) order the
commencement of and preside over debt renegotiation proceedings; (3) preempt
unilateral creditor suits; (4) determine fair terms of debt renegotiation and estab-
lish a ceiling on those terms; (5) preclude the parties from undertaking other rene-
gotiation efforts; (6) permit creditor banks’ suits to proceed as a sanction against
a debtor which refused to accept the renegotiated terms; and (7) require the debtor
to adopt internal adjustment measures as a condition to renegotiation (p. 135). The
authors’ emphasis is thus on unifying creditor-debtor negotiations and preventing
a “race to the courthouse.” The exclusive right to initiate adjunct proceedings
would rest with the debtor state provided that specific criteria relating to debt
sustainability were satisfied. Good-faith behavior by the debtor would be enforced
by the implicit threat that the ban on litigation could be revoked. 
While Barnett, Galvis, and Gouraige do not go into details on the legal basis
of the proposed new institution, it is implicit that unlike Oechsli’s (1981) proposal,
their plan would require a formal multilateral agreement. They concede that “the
political obstacles to approval of the plan are formidable ... A more modest plan,
however, may prove acceptable.” This would involve a legally nonbinding “central
mechanism to handle debt problems,” as well as “the adoption of a multilateral
agreement establishing guidelines for debt renegotiation.”
Much along the lines of Barnett, Galvis, and Gouraige’s proposal, which he
was apparently unaware of, Benjamin Cohen (1989a, b) calls for the creation, “by
multilateral convention,” of a new “International Debt Restructuring Agency”
(IDRA). “Ideally, it would be organized as a wholly new and independent entity
in order to underscore its neutrality ... In practice, it might be more feasible to get
IDRA started as a joint subsidiary of the two multilateral agencies most involved
with the problem now, the IMF and the World Bank.” As in Barnett, Galvis, and
Gouraige’s proposal, the IDRA’s primary role would be that of a facilitator, medi-
ators and monitor, but Cohen’s proposal allows for a more heavy-handed role if
necessary: “IDRA could conceivably be authorized to compel agreement in the
event of deadlock in order to suppress any remaining temptation among lenders to
free ride. For example, dissenting creditors might be obliged to accept terms
agreed by a qualified majority if IDRA declared the proposed settlement to be ‘fair
and equitable’.” (B. Cohen (1989a), p. 33.)
Barnett, Galvis, and Gouraige and Cohen differ slightly in their characteriza-
tion of the underlying collective action problem. While the former worry about
competing creditor litigation, Cohen is concerned with incentives to free ride on a
settlement reached by a majority, as well as the underprovision of new financing.
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acceptance of a restructuring proposal, and if necessary, giving the IDRA powers
to impose a settlement. As far as debtor incentives are concerned, Cohen suggests
that debt relief granted under the process could be, in part, made conditional on
good debtor behavior: “Creditors would be permitted to withdraw all concessions
on such matters as interest rates if IDRA determined that a debtor was not
complying with its policy commitments.” He is less clear on how the IDRA would
encourage debtors to negotiate in good faith and stick to the specified timetable.
Unlike Barnett, Galvis, and Gouraige, Cohen does not discuss the possibility of
having the agency authorize, and if necessary revoke, a stay of litigation while
negotiations are ongoing.
Cohen’s proposal had broad resonance in the policy debate at the time.
B. Miller (1991) dismisses the creation of an IDRA as unfeasible, and instead
explores the possibility of amending the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (in particular,
Chapter 9) to allow sovereigns to benefit from U.S. bankruptcy protections.
However, he cautions that this may not protect debtors from claims by non-U.S.
creditors, and could lead to jurisdictional problems. In contrast, Williamson
(1992) embraces the IDRA idea and—echoing his 1985 contribution—suggests
that it might operate largely on a private contractual basis: “An International Debt
Restructuring Agency would base its legitimacy on clauses in future loan contracts
specifying that the terms of the contract could be revised by the agency to take
account of unforeseen contingencies, and that both creditors and debtors would be
bound by its decision” (p. 95).23
Roughly coinciding with Cohen is Raffer’s (1990) proposal for an interna-
tional insolvency procedure modeled after Chapter 9 of the U.S. bankruptcy code,
which applies bankruptcy reorganization principles to municipalities. Like
Barnett, Galvis, and Gouraige and Cohen, Raffer envisages a structured negotia-
tion procedure overseen by a new international body. Raffer refers to it as a
“neutral court of arbitration,” implying that it would have considerable powers,
much like a domestic bankruptcy court. In his plan, creditors and debtor countries
would nominate an equal number of arbitrators, who in turn would nominate a
chairperson. Raffer argues that in all other respects, “an adaptation of Chapter 9 to
the international setting would only require minor changes.”
What distinguishes Raffer’s proposal is the emphasis on Chapter 9 rather than
Chapter 11 as the right domestic analogy for sovereign bankruptcy.24 He seems to
prefer Chapter 9 for two reasons. First, it is not vulnerable to the objection that a
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23Williamson also develops the idea (already hinted at in his 1985 paper) to condition debt relief on
debtor behavior prior to the crisis. He suggests a set of criteria “intended to provide an incentive for the
lenders to behave responsibly, as well as to identify circumstances in which efficiency considerations
would indicate a need for debt relief” (p. 94).
24Chapter 9 as a guide for sovereign bankruptcy is mentioned in earlier contributions by Raffer (1989)
and Malagardis and Nitsch (1988), but without developing the argument. Whether or not Chapter 9 is in
fact a better guide for sovereign bankruptcy than Chapter 11 has remained controversial. Schwarcz (2000,
p. 128) dismisses the distinction as secondary, arguing that “Chapter 9 adds little to the other Chapters
because it primarily incorporates their provisions by reference,” and the provisions original to Chapter 9
“are obvious anyway.” White (2002) states that “Chapter 9 provides little guidance for a sovereign
bankruptcy procedure because it has been used only rarely.”Chapter 11 for countries would not work because of the impossibility of “liqui-
dating” a state entity. Furthermore, as Raffer emphasizes, Chapter 9 limits court
interference with the municipalities’ political or governmental powers, and gives
certain groups that might be affected by the reorganization plan (such as unions
and debtor employees) the right to be heard. In Raffer’s view, this provides an
opportunity for balancing the interests of creditors with the welfare of domestic
citizens as well as national sovereignty, which he thinks were disregarded in offi-
cial attempts to resolve the debt crisis during the 1980s.
A final contribution in this group is a little-known proposal by Daniel Kaeser
(1990), a Swiss treasury official. Building on suggestions by the “Languetin
Group,” an independent commission charged by the Swiss government with
proposing solutions to the debt crisis, the centerpiece of Kaeser’s proposal is the
creation of a sovereign debt workout mechanism under the auspices of the IMF or
some other international agency. However, Kaeser goes further in several respects.
In essence, he wants to tackle three problems at once: first, create a mechanism for
efficient debt reduction; second, discourage future overindebtedness; and third,
allow countries with sustainable debt levels to access private capital at relatively
low cost. To reconcile the last two objectives, he proposes setting a hard, statutory,
solvency criterion—for example, a debt-service threshold of 25 percent of export
revenues. Actual indebtedness would be continuously monitored through a central-
ized registry. In the event that debt-service commitments were to rise above the
threshold, a country could petition the international bankruptcy agency. Relief
would be tranched and conditioned on adjustment policies, in the context of an IMF
program. Countries below the threshold would not be eligible for debt relief. 
In Kaeser’s view, this mechanism would serve as a disincentive to excessive
indebtedness while still allowing countries with low debt to access the capital
market. To further encourage such access, he additionally suggests an insurance
fund that would partly guarantee interest payments by countries staying below
the debt service threshold. Furthermore, he proposes using the same criterion to
differentiate the provisioning requirements of creditor banks. Since debt service
would (by definition) fall below the threshold after a restructuring, this would
also help address the underprovision of new financing emphasized by Sachs and
many others.
Kaeser seems to be the first author to suggest a sovereign bankruptcy mecha-
nism strictly geared to countries that are overindebted as defined by some “objec-
tive” criterion, as opposed to any country in payments difficulties. As we shall see,
this idea fades in the 1990s, but eventually reappears (Krueger, 2001). 
III. After Mexico: The IMF as an International Bankruptcy Court?
The implementation of the Brady plan in 1991 and the subsequent resumption of
capital flows to emerging markets brought a temporary lull to the literature on
sovereign debt restructuring mechanisms. This was quickly reversed in the wake
of the Mexican crisis and the ensuing U.S./IMF crisis loan, beginning with an
influential lecture by Jeffrey Sachs (1995), “Do We Need an International Lender
of Last Resort?” (April 20, 1995). 
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indeed suffer from inefficiencies that could be used to justify a lender of last
resort, but that in practice the IMF is so ineffective in exercising this function—
partly by design,25 partly due to incompetence—that these inefficiencies would be
addressed much more successfully if it were to give up its lending role and instead
assume that of a bankruptcy court. “IMF practices should be reorganized such that
the IMF plays a role far more like an international bankruptcy court and far less
like the lender of last resort to member governments” (p. 14). 
Sachs does not go into details on how his vision of the IMF as a bankruptcy
court would be implemented. He argues that the IMF’s existing mandate to approve
exchange rate restrictions under Article VIII (2)(b) of its charter might give it legal
cover to sanction payments moratoria, adding that “of course, more directly, the
Articles themselves could be amended.” He points to the holdout creditor problem
at the beginning of his lecture, but does not state how holdout creditors would be
disciplined under his plan, and whether this would require changes in member
countries’domestic laws.
Sachs’s 1995 lecture did not break new ground either in the analysis of
collective action problems and panics, which are amply covered in his 1984
study, or in terms of specific institutional suggestions, which are preceded by
several proposals made during the 1980s, as shown in the previous section.
Rather, Sachs’s innovation consisted in taking a much broader view of the prob-
lems that a bankruptcy mechanism might help resolve: not just the solvency
crises experienced during the 1980s, but also self-fulfilling debt runs as (he
argues) were experienced by Mexico in 1995, through a combination of IMF-
endorsed standstills and “administrative priority” of new private lending. This
mirrors the idea that standstills and last resort lending are alternative ways of
dealing with self-fulfilling runs, as argued in the academic literature by
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and particularly Wallace (1988).26 Admittedly,
contemporary theorists no longer believe it is appropriate to draw a sharp line
between pure runs and solvency crises (Morris and Shin, 1998), and the distinc-
tion has always been difficult to make in practice. In Sachs’s proposed
bankruptcy mechanism, however, the IMF would not have to distinguish
between these types of crises.
In effect, Sachs proposed a radical form of what much later became known
as “private sector involvement” in crisis resolution. Remarkably, he did this
without invoking the argument that official crisis lending leads to moral
hazard. His argument was merely that private sector involvement of this kind
would do the job of official crisis lending much more effectively, to the point
that it should replace official crisis lending altogether. Furthermore, Sachs
argued that this could be achieved without fundamentally new treaties or
institutions, by merely refocusing an existing institution, possibly even without
changing its statutes. 
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25“Since the IMF lends ‘taxpayer dollars’it is extremely reticent to lend in risky circumstances ... The
result is that IMF loans are usually too little, too late.”
26See Rogoff (1999) for a discussion.No wonder, then, that the Sachs lecture had immediate and widespread reso-
nance and a considerable impact.27 It provided the main impulse for a discussion
of the topic at the G-7 Halifax summit in June of 1995, which in turn led to the G-
10 paper on the resolution of sovereign liquidity crises (see next section).28 While
earlier proposals did not elicit much response, virtually all the literature published
after mid-1995 discusses Sachs. Although it was never formally published,
Sachs’s lecture probably did more to popularize the idea of international
bankruptcy than all of the literature that preceded him.
It is not widely known that at the time when Sachs was delivering his lecture,
the IMF Legal Department (1995) was preparing an extensive paper on how a
international bankruptcy mechanism under IMF auspices might be designed and
practically implemented (“Note on an International Debt Adjustment Facility,”
May 26, 1995).29 In some ways, this paper provides the counterpoint to Sachs’s
proposal. It is short on motivation: while free rider problems are occasionally
referred to in the text, there is no explicit analysis of the inefficiencies embodied
in the status quo, except to say that it is presently difficult to negotiate an orderly
restructuring for lack of a legal process. However, it is more specific than any of
the previous studies on how such a process could be legally established, struc-
tured, and implemented. It is also the first to contain a detailed discussion of the
desirable scope for a sovereign bankruptcy mechanism, arguing that it ought to
cover domestic as well as all external debt (except for debt owed to IFIs). 
Like Raffer (1990) and basically for the same reasons (namely, the public
and political nature of the debtors), the paper mainly utilizes the analogy with
Chapter 9 rather than Chapter 11, although bankruptcy codes from other coun-
tries are referred to as well. As appropriate for an IMF staff report, the paper lays
out options rather than pushing a specific “plan.” In particular, it distinguishes
between a “consensual approach” justified by Article V, Section 2(b) of the IMF
Articles, which authorizes the IMF to perform financial and technical services,
and a “mandatory approach” requiring “the creation of international treaty obli-
gations, which would, either directly or through specific enactments, become
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27See The Economist, April 22, 1995, p. 79 (“Why Can’t a Country Be Like a Firm?”); Financial
Times, May 1, 1995, p. 17 (“A Role for the IMF”); Martin Wolf in Financial Times, May 15, 1995, p. 22
(“On Sovereign Bankruptcies”); Peter Passell in the New York Times, June 22, 1995, p. 2 (“In Mexico-
Style Crises, the I.M.F. Could Be a Bankruptcy Court”); Minton-Beddoes (1995); and references relating
to the Halifax summit below.
28The Wall Street Journal, June 13, 1995 (p. A4) indirectly credits Sachs with putting the idea on the
summit’s agenda: “After considerable prodding by the U.S. and Canada, this week’s economic summit
will showcase a bold proposal to set up a kind of international bankruptcy court to help nations work
through insolvency ... Harvard University economist Jeffrey Sachs says the IMF could get out of the loan
business altogether if it moves to the bankruptcy court model.” The May 1995 “Report of the [Canadian]
House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade on the Issues of
International Financial Institutions Reforms for the Agenda of the June 1995 G-7 Halifax Summit” explic-
itly recommended to the Canadian government that “Canada continue to demonstrate international lead-
ership on debt relief issues by raising at Halifax the Sachs proposal for a larger reformed IMF role in
resolving sovereign debt crises” (recommendation 16; the entire document is available at
http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/g7/governmental/hc25/). See also the reporting on the summit in the Toronto
Financial Post, June 23, 1995, p. 10 (“Are Taxpayers on the Hook for G-7’s Plans for Reform”).
29For another contribution during this time see Salter (1995), who is also inspired by the Mexican crisis.part of the domestic law of participating states.” However, the paper quickly
dismisses the “consensual approach” as inadequate from the perspective of
dealing with free riders and establishing orderly procedures for negotiations, and
concentrates on the design of a “Facility” (meaning mechanism or body, not
lending facility or “debt facility”) established through “an amendment of the
Fund’s articles or a new treaty.”
The proposed “Facility” combines features of Barnett, Galvis, and Gouraige’s
“IMF adjunct” and Cohen’s International Debt Restructuring Agency. Like both
Barnett, Galvis, and Gouraige and Cohen, the IMF Legal Department (1995)
favors an arbitration body that would be independent from the IMF. This could be
created without a new treaty, through an amendment of the IMF’s Articles of
Agreement, either as “a separate organ within the Fund” (following the example
of the IMF’s Administrative Tribunal), or by establishing an independent “affiliate
institution” following precedents within the World Bank Group. The restructuring
process overseen by the facility would involve initiation by the debtor, formation
of a creditor committee and/or creditor registry, debtor preparation of a restruc-
turing plan (possibly with IMF participation), preferential status for new
financing, approval by a qualified majority of creditors, enforcement “against all
creditors, including creditors who voted against the plan” (p. 20), and “monitoring
of the debtor’s performance of the terms of the debt adjustment plan” (possibly
with IMF support). The paper also suggests endowing the facility with “cram-
down” powers along the lines of U.S. bankruptcy legislation: if “one or more
classes of creditors fail to approve the plan, the Facility may deem the plan
approved if the plan does not discriminate unfairly and a majority of creditors,
representing at least two-thirds of the total amount of debt owed to all creditors,
have approved the plan.”
Like Barnett, Galvis, and Gouraige, the paper envisages a stay of litigation
that would come into effect automatically after initiation. This “would have to
become part of the law the signatory states, and domestic courts would thus have
to enforce this provision.” The document also resembles Barnett, Galvis, and
Gouraige, with respect to the initiation procedures: while the debtor—and in
exceptional cases, the creditors—should be entitled to petition the facility for debt
adjustment, “the final determination as to whether initiation of the debt adjustment
process meets the required conditions will be made by the decision-making organ
of the Facility” (that is, not by the creditor committee). The “required condition”
is described as “its actual or prospective inability to service external debts as they
become due, i.e., illiquidity” (p. 15).
It is worth noting that a “Facility” designed along these lines would have been
sufficiently broad to play the role that Sachs wanted the IMF to play, in particular,
by (1) not attempting to distinguish between solvency and liquidity crises on initi-
ation; (2) legalizing a standstill via an automatic stay; and (3) giving preferential
treatment to new creditors. 
While the Legal Department’s document served as the basis for an IMF
Executive Board discussion in June of 1995, it did not result in any public initia-
tive, and never registered in public. Instead, the role of giving legal and practical
content to Sachs’s version of an international bankruptcy court was assumed by
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marrying the experience of the 1994–95 crisis with that of the 1980s—Chun is
motivated by the Mexican crisis. The emphasis is squarely on international
bankruptcy as an alternative to last resort lending, and the market failure that the
author seems to have in mind is primarily a self-fulfilling debt crisis, not an exter-
nality arising during debt workouts (although the creditor free rider problem is
mentioned to justify a cramdown provision).
Chun’s article was written after the June 1995 Halifax summit, at which both
the possibility of an International Bankruptcy Agency (IBA) and a large-scale
“Emergency Financing Mechanism” (EMF) were discussed, and takes the form of
comparing these two proposals. He comes down strongly on the side of the IBA.
His ideas on how this agency would function rely heavily on the Chapter 9
analogy, and include an automatic stay, preference for new financing, monitoring
powers for the IBA, and a cramdown provision. Like Barnett, Galvis, and
Gouraige and the IMF Legal Department, Chun argues that the IBA should be
established as a separate and independent affiliate of the IMF.
The main novelty of Chun’s article is the way in which the desirability of an
independent IBA is argued. The primary comparison is not with a situation of
uncoordinated default, but rather with crisis management involving large-scale
IMF lending. Chun makes Sachs’s point that a bankruptcy procedure would
improve over the IMF’s current international lender of last resort function because
of the inherently hesitant nature of IMF lending, which requires a reform program,
conditionality, and possibly tranching. In addition, however, Chun argues that an
IBA is better than an EMF on the grounds that it does not create moral hazard, a
point not made by Sachs. Together with Macmillan (1995b) and the G-10 Working
Group (see below), Chun is one of the first authors to explicitly invoke the moral
hazard argument to argue for a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism.31
IV. Orderly Workouts Without a Bankruptcy Court 
At about the same time at which an international bankruptcy mechanism via the
IMF or an independent IMF subsidiary was being explored by Sachs, IMF staff,
and others, several authors were working on alternative proposals for “orderly
workouts” that take a less sweeping approach. These proposals reject a centralized
international bankruptcy mechanism based on a new convention or an amendment
of existing treaties, arguing that this either is unfeasible, undesirable, or a combi-
nation of both. Instead, they seek to improve crisis resolution via legal changes in
some creditor countries, IMF and debtor country policies, and changes in bond
contracts between sovereign debtors and private creditors. 
The first paper in this category is a short Euromoney article by James Hurlock
(1995). Hurlock is one of the first to emphasize that the classic problems of
international debt restructuring—uncoordinated litigation, underprovision of new
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30In addition, Greenwood and Mercer (1995), provide a concise overview of the legal issues associ-
ated with creating a full-fledged international bankruptcy mechanism.
31As noted in Section II, the moral hazard argument had been used earlier in the debate on alterna-
tive strategies to resolve the debt crisis of the 1980s, see Bulow and Rogoff (1990).financing, and the holdout creditor problem—are made worse by the shift to bond
financing since the early 1990s. He rejects an IMF-based bankruptcy court as a
solution to these problems, however, on the grounds that “the Fund is ill-suited to
the role of neutral arbiter of sovereign debt disputes” because of its “political
nature and voting structure.” Instead, he proposes working through the U.S. and
U.K. legal systems to impose a stay and deal with rogue creditors. “The essential
predicate would be for certain key nations, such as the U.S., to close their courts
on a limited basis to creditors seeking to undermine a legitimate and fair restruc-
turing process that had been endorsed by an overwhelming majority of similarly
situated creditors.” This could be achieved by an amendment of the U.S. Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act “that would render a foreign state immune from suit,
or its property immune from attachment, if, in the context of a sovereign debt
workout, the litigating creditor were attempting to bring suit notwithstanding a
restructuring plan that was being negotiated in good faith by, or had been
accepted by, a supermajority of similarly situated creditors.”
An extensive study by Eichengreen and Portes (1995) takes a similar view of
the underlying problems, but surveys a much broader set of potential solutions.
After reviewing the rationale for bankruptcy procedures and the history of institu-
tions for renegotiating sovereign debts, the authors consider the potential role for
“an international bankruptcy court or tribunal,” but ultimately reject the idea,
primarily for feasibility reasons. Closing the courts to rogue creditors, as
suggested by Hurlock, is also dismissed, on the grounds that a change in statute in
a single country would not solve the problem, and enacting a treaty seems unlikely
given “the trend in recent years away from sovereign immunity,” as well as inter-
national human rights law guaranteeing court access.
The authors then come down in favor of a set of pragmatic institutional reform
proposals, including the creation of an international “Bondholder Council” to
complement the Paris and London Clubs, a redefined role for the IMF that could
include sanctioning standstills as a signaling device (“a definitive reinterpretation of
Article VIII(2)(b) would support the IMF in this role even if it did not have legal
effect in national courts”), a bigger emphasis on information dissemination, and
large-scale financing in a narrow set of circumstances, including contagion and self-
fulfilling runs. The most influential idea among Eichengreen and Portes’s proposals,
however, was to use majority clauses in debt contracts as the main device for over-
coming creditor collective action problems in the aftermath of a debt crisis. While
such clauses had long been included in bonds issued under U.K. law, this was not
true for most other jurisdictions, including New York. By pushing for the universal
adoption of such clauses, Eichengreen and Portes became the fathers of what is now
referred to as the “contractual approach” to orderly crisis resolution.
A third contribution in this group is a comprehensive legal article by Rory
Macmillan (1995b). Like Hurlock and Eichengreen and Portes, Macmillan is
particularly concerned with coordination problems among bondholders,w h i ch he
describes in some detail.32 In the literature surveyed here, he is the one of the first
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32A companion paper, Macmillan (1995a), is devoted mostly to analyzing that issue. He also suggests
some solutions, including collective action clauses in bond contracts.to reject large-scale crisis lending on the grounds that it creates moral hazard.33 He
shares Hurlock’s distaste for an international bankruptcy agency, particularly in
the form of a reborn IMF, but disagrees with Hurlock’s solution on the grounds
that it is too heavy-handed and insufficiently protective of creditor rights. 
His own proposal comprises two main elements. First, the creation of an inter-
national bondholder council along the lines proposed by Eichengreen and Portes, or
several national bondholder councils in the major financial centers, each repre-
senting the holders of bonds issued there. Second, addressing the free rider problem
among bondholders, through one of two alternative solutions. The first is a much
milder variant of the Hurlock idea of a stay via sovereign immunity, which would
apply only to emergency situations, and to bondholders individually but not collec-
tively. “Rather than granting complete immunity to the debtor, legislation might
remove bondholders’rights to sue but vest those rights collectively in the bondholder
council.” His second, preferred, approach is to “engineer solidarity” among bond-
holders by changing some of the rules under which creditors could sue. Specifically,
he proposes: (1) “a sharing obligation imposed by simple legislation” that would
force bondholders to share payments received from a court judgment with other
bondholders; (2) legislation requiring that “all legal actions over the bonds be
consolidated into a single legal action”; and (3) a legal minimum threshold of bond-
holders to bring a suit. This threshold would need to be sufficiently high to solve the
free rider problem. Macmillan reckons that 10 percent would be sufficient.
Macmillan argues that this approach would also solve the problem of encouraging
new financing: “if the incentives of existing creditors can be aligned so that priori-
tized new money is in their collective interest because there is no alternative, then
they will agree to a restricted subordination of their own debt.”
The final contribution in this set is the report of the G-10 Deputies Working
Group (1996), written in response to the Halifax summit’s request for “further
review by G-10 Ministers and Governors of other procedures that might also be
usefully be considered for [the] orderly resolution [of debt crises].”34 The report is
close to the pragmatic approach of Eichengreen and Portes (1995)—whose book
was commissioned as a background study to the report—but much more cautious.
Like Macmillan (1995b), the G-10 Working Group is very concerned with “mini-
mizing moral hazard for both creditors and debtors.” It shares Eichengreen and
Portes’s concerns about the feasibility of an international bankruptcy procedure,
but in addition is skeptical on the applicability of the bankruptcy analogy as such,
on the grounds that the management of economic policies in a sovereign state
cannot be taken over by a trustee, and that litigation “has not in the past been a
serious problem for sovereign debtors. Such debtors have few assets to seize and
some of these benefit from sovereign immunities” (p. 10). 
The paper recognizes the potential usefulness of temporary standstills, but
unlike Eichengreen and Portes, does “not consider that it would be feasible to
operate any formal mechanism for signaling the official community’s approval of
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33Eichengreen and Portes (1995) also mention moral hazard, as a reason why the advanced country
governments may be reluctant to support large future crisis loans à la Mexico in 1995.
34Halifax Summit Review of the International Financial Institutions, Background Document, Chapter 5.a suspension of payments by the debtor.”35 The proposed approach is to encourage
standstills “in exceptional circumstances” via IMF lending into arrears. Most of
the emphasis is on “contractual or statutory provisions governing debt contracts”
that would improve communication between debtor and creditors and discipline
rogue creditors. “Such provisions are those that (a) provide for the collective
representation of debt holders in the event of the crisis, (b) allow for qualified
majority voting to alter the terms and conditions of debt contracts, and (c) require
the sharing among creditors of assets received from the debtor.” Developments in
this direction should be “market led” but “should receive official support as appro-
priate.” No specifics are offered on what form this official support could take.
V. Proposals During 2000–2001
After 1996, there was a brief lull in the literature on sovereign debt workouts, as
world attention focused on the Asian financial crisis, which revolved mainly around
private debt. However, this soon gave way to a second wave of crises in which
sovereign debt played a significant role (including in Russia, Ukraine, Brazil,
Ecuador, Pakistan, Turkey, and Argentina). By 2000, proposals to improve the
handling of sovereign debt crises were back on center stage. For the most part, they
relate closely to the preceding discussion round during 1995–96, but a few go
substantially beyond. In what follows, we survey the main contributions prior to
Anne Krueger’s November 2001 speech proposing a Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Mechanism, focusing on contributions by Haldane and M. Kruger (2001),
Eichengreen (2000), Lerrick and Meltzer (2001), and Schwarcz (2000). As we shall
see, these four papers occupy the full spectrum from proposals that would require
little or no statutory changes to ambitious statutory initiatives.
Haldane and M. Kruger (2001) propose IMF-endorsed payments moratoria as
the centerpiece of a structured crisis resolution mechanism, in which large bailouts
are avoided except as a last resort in crises that threaten the stability of the inter-
national financial system.36Their approach has some remarkable parallels with the
original Oechsli (1981) proposal. First, it is a nonstatutory approach (no laws or
treaties would need to be changed to adopt it, only policies). In addition, it follows
the bankruptcy reorganization analogy quite closely, as the authors envisage (1) a
payments moratorium legitimized by an independent authority such as the IMF
(although this authority would not have particular legal powers); (2) seniority to
new financing; and (3) bargaining between debtors and creditors during the dura-
tion of the standstill. What is lacking—in both Haldane and M. Kruger, and
Oechsli (1981)—is protection from litigation, and a provision to impose agree-
ment on a dissenting minority.
What makes Haldane and M. Kruger a “modern” proposal and differentiates
it from Oechsli is, first, the motivation. They think of IMF-endorsed unilateral
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35This is in line with an extensive paper by the IMF Legal Department (1996) on the topic, which was
prepared for the G-10 Working Group. It concluded that “The Fund’s Articles of Agreement do not autho-
rize the Fund to endorse moratoria and bind dissenting creditors, nor to approve those foreign decisions
that permit a member to default on its loans” (p. 38).
36See Miller and Zhang (2000) for a theoretical analysis of standstills.standstills as a mechanism to deal with both liquidity crises and debt crises.
Moreover, like most papers written on this topic since 1995, they worry about the
moral hazard implications of large bailouts. Second, unlike Oechsli, they are
explicit about how to create incentives for debtor good behavior—a critical issue
in their proposal, since there is no independent authority with statutory powers—
namely, by offering the “carrot” of IMF lending into arrears. Debtor good behavior
is effectively defined as the kind of behavior that would result under a full-fledged,
statutory Chapter 11 process. It would be required by IMF conditionality attached
to lending into arrears, and would include good faith bargaining with creditors
during the standstill (“good faith” being defined as not seeking debt reduction
beyond what is necessary to establish medium-term debt sustainability), equal
treatment of creditors, giving seniority to new money, transparency (i.e., informa-
tion provision to creditors), and—perhaps less plausibly—a time limit to the
standstill. In other words, the debtor would be expected to lift the standstill and re-
expose itself to the creditor grab race if agreement were not reached within a spec-
ified time frame (unless the IMF can be convinced that this was because creditors
refused a reasonable offer).
Haldane and M. Kruger recognize that the holdout creditor problem is not
addressed in their proposal, but argue that this problem is overstated. They also
suggest that if the debtor played by IMF-recognized rules of good behavior, this
might strengthen its hand in domestic courts. They do not refer to the possibility
of using Article VIII(2)(b) as a basis for “legalizing” standstills.
Barry Eichengreen’s (2000) main thesis is that attempts to limit “the moral
hazard caused by IMF bailouts” are not credible, and will not be effective, so long
as the international community does not find alternative ways to resolve sovereign
debt crises. Like Haldane and M. Kruger, he argues in favor of a nonstatutory
approach, along the lines of his 1995 report with Richard Portes. He concentrates on
two of the proposals advanced in that report: IMF-endorsed standstills and collective
action clauses in bond contracts. Standstills would deal with liquidity problems and
self-fulfilling runs, while collective action clauses would be the main instrument for
addressing the “restructuring problem.” Thus, standstills serve a more limited
purpose in Eichengreen’s proposal than in Haldane and M. Kruger (2001).
Eichengreen’s view that standstills are good only as panic breakers but insuf-
ficient in the context of debt restructuring seems to rest on two arguments. First,
standstills do not address the collective action problems associated with debt
restructuring negotiations—in particular, the holdout creditor problem—and do
not by themselves protect the debtor from litigation. In the case of a panic, this is
less of an issue, since the debtor pays in full after the panic is over. Second, unless
backed up by Article VIII or changes in national laws, the leverage of the IMF over
the debtor in a standstill is relatively weak. The IMF has some effect on the
debtor’s reputation and the potential “carrot” of lending into arrears (emphasized
in Haldane and M. Kruger’s proposal), but it cannot influence the debtor by, say,
threatening to remove the standstill. This does not matter in a pure panic, which,
by definition, can be resolved without corrective actions on the side of the debtor,
but it may matter in a debt restructuring, when policy adjustments and good faith
bargaining by the debtor are required.
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solve these additional problems, and goes a bit further than Eichengreen and
Portes (1995) and the G-10 Working Group in discussing what the official commu-
nity could do to encourage their adoption. Because there is an externality involved
in not adopting such clauses, there is, in principle, a rationale for official inter-
vention. He proposes that “the official community should lead by example, as the
British and Canadian governments have done, and that it should subsidize the
issue of bonds featuring CACs [collective action clauses], perhaps by having the
IMF express a readiness to provide emergency assistance on more attractive terms
of countries prepared to adopt the measure” (p. 39).37
Lerrick and Meltzer (2001) propose an IMF-supported debt workout mecha-
nism motivated along very similar lines as Eichengreen (2000). Repeated large-
scale crisis lending “creates moral hazard and subverts incentives”; consequently,
some other way must be found to address the market failures that generate pres-
sures for bailouts in the first place. The main elements proposed are somewhat
analogous to the Haldane and M. Kruger approach: first, an IMF-endorsed mora-
torium on debt payments; second, debtor-creditor negotiation during the morato-
rium; third, IMF financial support. However, the form that this support would
take is radically different. Rather than lending funds conditionally for general
balance of payments use, the IMF would lend unconditionally, for a limited time
period, to place a floor below secondary market debt prices at 80–85 percent of
the fraction of debt that is deemed sustainable. Thus, the sole purpose of this form
of IMF financing would be to prevent debt prices falling below “reasonable”
levels during the restructuring period. While the Lerrick-Meltzer approach does
not require a new treaty or changes in national laws, this constitutes a large depar-
ture from the IMF’s traditional role that could require an amendment of the
Articles of Agreement.38
In contrast with Haldane and M. Kruger’s proposal, the role of this form of
IMF support is not to create good debtor incentives while the country is restruc-
turing (Lerrick and Meltzer do not believe this to be a significant issue), but to
prevent creditor panic and contagion by maintaining the liquidity of the sovereign
debt market during the restructuring period. Thus, Lerrick and Meltzer would
disagree with Eichengreen’s (2000) view that “officially sanctioned standstills,”
by themselves, constitute a “solution to the panic problem.” In part, this might be
because Eichengreen has a broader version of standstills in mind that would
restrict most cross-border flows, not just sovereign debt payments. What mainly
drives Lerrick and Meltzer’s proposal, however, is the view that it is primarily the
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37As it turns out, the last proposal faces some legal obstacles, as Article V, Section 8(d) of the IMF
Articles stipulates that the IMF’s rates of charge must be uniform across members drawing from a given
facility. This would preclude modifying the charge solely on the basis whether a member’s bond contracts
incorporate CACs or not.
38Lerrick and Meltzer argue that the proposal is consistent with Article I, that is, the general purposes
of the IMF. However, the proposal may conflict with Article V Section 3(b), which states that the IMF’s
general resources can only be used to meet a member’s balance of payments need, and Article VI, which
precludes members from using Fund resources to meet a large or sustained capital outflow. See
International Monetary Fund’s International Capital Markets, Policy Development and Review, and
Research Departments (2002) on this point and for a general critique of the proposal.collapse of debt prices itself that fuels panic and contagion. With debt traded on
international markets, this could occur even with perfect capital controls, and thus
would require an extra instrument to address it.
As in the Haldane and M. Kruger approach, there is no legal instrument in
Lerrick and Meltzer’s proposal that would protect the debtor from litigation and
impose a majority-backed agreement on holdouts. Lerrick and Meltzer argue that
this is not necessary, both because the international assets of a sovereign debtor are
hard to attach, and because the existence of a debt price floor would reduce the
profitability of holding out. “Vulture funds” could no longer buy debt at extremely
low prices, and the margin between the price floor and the face value of the debt
might not be worth the costs of a court battle.
Steven Schwarcz (2000) presents perhaps the most comprehensive legal treat-
ment so far on how the provisions of Chapter 11 (or Chapter 9, the distinction is
dismissed as secondary) could be applied at the international level. According to
Schwarcz, the status quo embodies three inefficiencies: “the collective action
problem of reaching agreement among creditors,” “moral hazard” created by IMF
bailouts (both vis-à-vis countries and creditors), and the underprovision of new
private financing, leading to an excessive reliance on public money via the IMF. To
address these, he proposes “a supranational legal framework for sovereign debt
restructuring,” a draft of which is attached to his paper. He argues that “recent
proposals to contractually solve the collective action problem in bonds by intro-
ducing supermajority voting clauses in new bond issues are unlikely to be successful”
because “only consenting bondholders would be bound. As a result, a state cannot
rely on a contractual approach to bind holders of the large stock of existing long-term
bonds, much less future creditors that choose not to consent” (p. 166). 
However, Schwarcz takes a much more minimalistic approach than previous
statutory approaches. His intellectual strategy is to set out desirable principles for
an international Chapter 11—basically, fostering economic rehabilitation of the
debtor while “minimally affecting non-bankruptcy incentives”—and ask how these
could be attained with as little “adjudicatory discretion” as possible. The result is
remarkable for what it does not contain: (1) no automatic “stay” of creditor claims
following inititation, on the grounds that the sovereign can declare a payments
moratorium, and creditors have no significant recourse against this since there are
“relatively few assets located in other jurisdictions”; (2) no officially organized
creditor committees, since his convention would provide sufficient incentives for
creditors to organize themselves on an ad hoc basis; (3) no cramdown rule (over
and above the basic supermajority rule) to impose a restructuring agreement on a
dissenting creditor class, on the grounds that implementing cramdown requires
valuing the debtor as a going concern, which is hard to do for sovereigns;39 and (4)
no international bankruptcy court or greatly extended role for the IMF, on the
grounds that his proposed convention would be largely self-enforcing.
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39Under the “absolute priority rule,” a settlement can be imposed on a dissenting creditor class if
either creditors in the dissenting class receive the full value of their claims or if claims that are junior in
priority receive nothing. Implementing this rule requires valuing the debtor as a going concern, which
Schwarcz argues is too hard in the international context.What survives from Chapter 11 in Schwarcz’s convention are three simple
proposals regarding initiation, new private financing, and supermajority agree-
ment to a restructuring plan: “(1) only a State itself, and not its creditors, may
commence the restructuring case, and must do so in good faith; (2) financiers of
the debtor-State’s debt restructuring must have priority over claims of other cred-
itors . . .; and (3) all creditors be bound to a plan or reorganization that is agreed
to by super-majority voting by classes of claims, and, upon such agreement, debts
not provided for in the plan be discharged. The Convention would also require
each ratifying State to enact the Convention’s rules into national law” (pp. 158–9).
Schwarcz argues that while a full-fledged international bankruptcy court
would be superfluous under his convention, “a tribunal would be required to settle
interpretive disputes in very limited circumstances” (p. 179). For this limited role
he proposes creating an arbitration panel along the lines of the World Bank
Group’s International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes. He also
sees a role for the IMF as “the location where States file their debt-restructuring
cases,” to help the arbitration panel decide whether a filing occurred in good faith
and if excessive new financing undermined the rights of existing creditors, and as
a source or intermediary for interim financing. 
VI. Comparing Ideas, 1976–2001: A Synthesis 
This study set out to describe the development of ideas on international
bankruptcy on the basis of two questions. First, what is the economic inefficiency
that the proposals seek to address? Second, how do they propose to change incen-
tives in a way that would address this inefficiency? We now summarize the
answers to these questions.
The Basic Conundrum: Collective Action Problems and Moral Hazard
As far as the perceived inefficiencies go that motivate the proposals for institu-
tional and legal improvements in sovereign debt restructuring, there is a clear
progression. From the late 1970s to the mid-1990s, the emphasis was on ineffi-
cient debt workouts caused by various incentive problems on the creditor side. For
the early contributors, particularly Oechsli (1981), the main problem was a coor-
dination failure between the public and private sectors. Most subsequent authors
characterized the problem as free riding among private creditors in the context 
of debt workouts, but emphasize different aspects. The legal literature, particularly
Barnett, Galvis, and Gouraige (1984) and IMF Legal Department (1995), viewed
a potential “race to the courthouse” as a significant threat impeding orderly
negotiations. The economic literature, including Sachs (1986a, b) and B. Cohen
(1989a, b) was more concerned with the underprovision of new financing and free
riding that impedes or delays the successful conclusion of debt restructuring nego-
tiations. Since a debt write-down by a portion of creditors will increase the
capacity of the debtor to repay the remaining creditors, such free riding could be
an impediment to restructuring even when litigation is not an issue (assuming
there are other reasons that keep the debtor from simply repudiating).
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crisis—emphasizes an additional inefficiency: debt panics, that is, self-fulfilling
runs. In technical terms, the difference between this and inefficient debt workouts
is that the former emphasizes multiple equilibria (one of which, the “run” equilib-
rium, is inefficient) while the latter involves a unique, but inefficient, equilibrium.
In more practical terms, the difference is between a situation where a creditor
collective action problem can cause a crisis, and one where it is an obstacle to its
efficient resolution. While the distinction had been made in the academic literature
since the early 1980s, it was only after the Mexican crisis that bankruptcy mecha-
nisms of various kinds were proposed as a solution to both problems (Sachs, 1995;
Eichengreen and Portes, 1995; Chun, 1996). Sovereign bankruptcy mechanisms or
agencies were now being suggested not just as a complement of existing institu-
tions such as the IMF, whose traditional responsibilities include lending to
members with liquidity problems, but as alternatives to traditional crisis lending.
This view was reinforced by a growing consensus that large-scale crisis lending a
la Mexico created “moral hazard,” particularly on the creditor side (Macmillan,
1995b; G-10 Working Group, 1996; and Chun, 1996). 
The desire to avoid the moral hazard attributed to large-scale crisis lending is
common to virtually all proposals related to orderly debt workouts that have been
made in recent years (Haldane and M. Kruger, 2001; Eichengreen, 2000; Lerrick
and Meltzer, 2001; Schwarcz, 2000; Krueger, 2001, 2002; and Taylor, 2002). In
these papers, collective action problems are still viewed as the primary ineffi-
ciency that could justify public intervention in the form of IMF bailouts, but the
focus is now on the new distortions introduced by the bailout itself. An interna-
tional bankruptcy mechanism of some form is viewed as an alternative, less distor-
tionary, way of dealing with the underlying market failures, and perhaps a
necessary element in committing the international community not to undertake
large bailouts. 
Dealing With Creditor Incentives: Competing Approaches
Given the shared concern with a creditor collective action problem in some form,
all papers in this literature contain proposals to change creditor incentives almost
by definition. However, they vary widely on how to approach the issue. One end
of the spectrum is occupied by what is now referred to as “statutory” proposals,
including Barnett, Galvis, and Gouraige, (1984), B. Cohen (1989), Kaeser (1990),
Raffer (1990), Reinisch (1994), Greenwood and Mercer (1995), Hurlock (1995),
IMF Legal Department (1995), Sachs (1995), Chun (1996), and Schwarcz (2000),
among others. These papers propose changes in either national or international law
to create rules or institutions under which (super-) majority-backed agreements
could be imposed on holdouts, new financing could be given seniority, and—in
some proposals—sovereigns would be shielded from litigation during payments
moratoria, or while negotiating. The main alternative to the statutory proposals is
the “contractual approach,” which focuses on the way contracts between creditors
and debtors are written. This is associated with Eichengreen and Portes (1995), the
G-10 Deputies Working Group (1996), Eichengreen (2000), and to a lesser extent
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least for a given debt instrument—through the incorporation of clauses in bond
contracts that would impose a majority-backed restructuring on dissenters, and
perhaps require the sharing of proceeds from litigation. There remains a potential
for free riding across debt instruments—referred to as the “aggregation problem”
in the more recent literature—although this could perhaps be contractually
addressed as well. 
Broadly speaking, the contractual and statutory approaches differ in two
respects. First, the pure contractual approach focuses on resolving the basic
holdout problem and—in some proposals—on discouraging litigation. In contrast,
statutory proposals usually take aim at a broader range of problems, including
providing seniority to new money by administrative fiat. Second, by definition, the
statutory approach requires changes in laws, while the contractual approach does
not. However, the incorporation of collective action and sharing clauses in debt
contracts is of course an endogenous variable, raising the question of how credi-
tors and debtors can be persuaded to adopt them. The simplest answer, given by
Macmillan (1995b), is: through legal changes in the major creditor countries,
which would take one back to a version of the statutory approach. However, there
may also be nonstatutory incentives as suggested by Eichengreen (2000): publicly
subsidizing changes in private contracts, or IMF conditionality.
Finally, some proposals—notably Oechsli (1981), Haldane and M. Kruger
(2001), and Lerrick and Meltzer (2001)—focus on official policies and do not
propose any legal changes, whether contractual or statutory. These proposals tend
to be less concerned with free riding among private creditors and more with partic-
ular other inefficiencies: Oechsli with coordination failures between private and
official creditors; Haldane and M. Kruger with sudden stops and creditor panics as
well as debtor incentives to negotiate; and Lerrick and Meltzer with creditor panics
and contagion. The last two papers recognize that their proposals will not directly
deal with litigation and holdouts, but play down the magnitude of this problem.
What About Debtor Incentives?
Most papers discussed in this survey ignore bad debtor incentives as a potential
reason why debt workouts can be protracted and inefficient. Since negotiation
delays and perhaps failures could in principle arise from debtor actions as much
as creditor actions—either as a consequence of strategic behavior, or because the
debtor side exhibits collective action or political economy problems of its own—
this is a rather striking omission. However, the majority of authors surveyed here
do recognize implicitly or explicitly that debtor incentives can become an issue as
a by-product of the measures that are put in place to address the creditor collec-
tive action problem. A stay of litigation, protection from holdout creditors, or an
IMF-endorsed standstill imply a measure of debtor protection from the usual
market discipline. What is to guarantee that this protection is not abused?
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40Arguably, Williamson (1985, 1992) also belongs in this group, since he envisages a contractual
basis for an international debt restructuring agency.One answer is that having debtor countries sign an international convention
that subjects them to certain rules might by itself induce good behavior, just like
countries that have signed the IMF Articles of Agreement tend to abide by its rules
(Schwarcz, 2000, footnote 210). But this argument applies only to the statutory
proposals, and even there raises questions of remedy in the event that rules are
broken. An alternative answer is that good incentives for the debtor can be created
by the threat of reverting to the status quo ante in the event that the debtor does
not negotiate in good faith. For example, in Haldane and M. Kruger (2001), the
“carrot” of IMF endorsement (including lending into arrears) would be conditional
on country good behavior. A similar argument can be made for proposals that
envisage a stay of litigation during and after negotiations, as in Barnett, Galvis,
and Gouraige, (1984) or IMF Legal Department (1995). 
An interesting implication of this argument is that transposing bankruptcy
procedures to the international level need not require an arbiter with statutory powers
vis-à-vis the debtor. All that is required to create incentives for debtor good behavior
is the presence of an initial inefficiency that hurts debtors, and which the arbiter (or
a majority of creditors acting collectively) would have the power to remove and rein-
state if necessary. Whether this would in fact be the case under the specific proposals
that have been put forward is of course not obvious. It depends on why defaults are
costly in the first place, and whether the proposals contain anything that would affect
that cost. In particular, how important are the potential legal costs of defaults rela-
tive to other mechanisms, such as reputation? And how successful would an orderly
bankruptcy procedure be in mitigating the reputational losses arising from a debt
restructuring? While the economics literature has attempted to address some of these
issues since the 1980s, there are no hard answers to these questions.
A related problem is whether smoother debt workout procedures could under-
mine debtor incentives ex ante, that is, create debtor moral hazard—for example,
with respect to fiscal policy and debt management, or simply because debtors may
try less hard to avoid defaults. A possible consequence would be a higher cost of
borrowing and lower capital flows. Only a minority of the papers we surveyed—
particularly Eichengreen and Portes (1995), Macmillan (1995b), Eichengreen
(2000), and Haldane and M. Kruger (2001)—discuss this potential problem in some
detail. Predictably, most of these authors conclude that debtor moral hazard is not an
issue we should be overly worried about. A mix of the following arguments is
invoked: (1) even from the perspective of getting debtor incentives right ex ante, the
costs of defaults may be too high at present (for example, they may encourage
gambles for redemption—anything to avoid defaults); (2) assuming defaults do
indeed become more frequent as a consequence of lower default costs, this may well
be efficient—it may be better to have occasional low-cost debt restructuring than
more infrequent but disastrous crises; (3) if that is the case, it is not obvious that the
cost of capital would in fact go up, since the likelihood of debt restructurings would
rise but creditor losses conditional on debt restructurings would fall;41 and (4) even
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41A new empirical literature on the issue of whether collective action clauses would raise borrowing
costs generally backs this view; see Eichengreen and Mody (2000, 2001) and Becker, Richards, and
Thaicharoen (2001).if the cost of capital increases and the average volume of capital flows declines, this
may be welfare improving if it goes along with a higher stability of capital flows.
The general challenge to this line of argument is as follows. Sovereign lending
lacks collateral and/or judicial contract enforcement of the kind that we see at the
domestic level. Consequently, could it not be that the painful consequences of
defaults are the market’s answer to the lack of collateral, the device that makes
international debt markets possible? And if so, will official or institutional
tinkering with these default costs not make things worse?42 The answer, in equally
general terms, is “yes” only if debt restructuring costs are an efficient market
response (in particular, through the way in which contracts are written) to the lack
of collateral or enforcement. However, if it is impossible to write complete debt
contracts (for example, because the debtor cannot commit to refrain from further
borrowing), that may not be the case (Bolton and Jeanne, 2002). Inefficient capital
structures may arise—for example, excessive short-term borrowing. In that case,
new institutions, such as an international bankruptcy mechanism, can bring debt
outcomes closer into line with the first best. Whether the existing proposals would
achieve that is a separate question, but in principle, the argument can be made.
VII. Conclusion
We have characterized the development of ideas on international bankruptcy over
the last 25 years. Turning to the present, how do the most recent proposals fit in?
Krueger’s (2001) proposed “Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism” (SDRM)
is a statutory proposal in the tradition of Barnett, Galvis, and Gouraige (1984) and
IMF Legal Department (1995). It defines an important role for the IMF, particu-
larly in endorsing a debtor country’s request for activation of a stay, and in
revoking the stay (or refusing to extend it) if the country does not implement
corrective policies and negotiate in good faith. In contrast, in the statutory
approach of Krueger (2002), these roles would be played by a majority of credi-
tors acting collectively, rather than an intervening international agency. In addi-
tion, she envisages an independent court-like arbitration panel to resolve disputes,
but with narrow functions, along the lines of Schwarcz’s (2000) proposed tribunal
for settling interpretational disputes. Finally, Taylor (2002) is a contractual
proposal in the tradition of Eichengreen and Portes (1995), but goes further in two
respects: first, by suggesting clauses stipulating how the debt restructuring process
would be organized in addition to the standard majority action clause; and second,
by being more explicit on the incentives that might encourage the adoption of such
clauses. Taylor suggests that having such clauses might be a precondition for
receiving IMF financial support and/or that countries might qualify for lower IMF
interest rates.43
Figure 1 presents a classification of most proposals covered in this paper in
terms of the main inefficiency that motivates them (vertical axis) as well as their
basic approach: changes in official policies, changes in debt contracts, or changes
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42This is the line taken by Cline (2000, 2001). For a related argument, see Dooley (2000).
43As was pointed out above, the latter raises some legal issues; see footnote 37 above.in laws and treaties at either the national or international level (horizontal axis).
These classifications do not do full justice to many papers. For example,
Eichengreen and Portes (1995) and Eichengreen (2000) are not just about the
contractual approach and changes in official policies, but include some statutory
ideas at the international level as well, and Kaeser (1990) is not just concerned
with the efficiency of workouts but also with preventing overindebtedness.
Moreover, some proposals are missing from the figure because they have
ambiguous classifications in terms of Figure 1. Williamson’s (1985, 1992) call for
an international debt restructuring agency would seem to put him in the right
column, but he also suggests that an IDRA could be established mainly on a
private contractual basis. Lerrick and Meltzer (2001) think of themselves as an
approach based only on changes in official policies, but the IMF’s Legal
Department believes that it would require statutory changes (to the IMF’s
Articles). In spite of these shortcomings, the figure may be useful as a rough
summary. 
At first blush, the message of the figure is simple: while it is easy to order the
various proposals so that there is a steady chronological progression along the
vertical axis, that is, in terms of motivation, the same cannot be said of the hori-
zontal axis. In particular, the proposals put forward during 2000–2001 cover the
entire horizontal spectrum, from an approach that is mainly based on changes in
IMF policies (Haldane and M. Kruger, 2001) to one that calls for far-reaching
statutory changes (Krueger, 2001). 
However, the figure also suggests a trend of a different kind. Not only is the
history of ideas on sovereign bankruptcy procedures far longer and far more elab-
orate than is commonly known, but the call for sovereign bankruptcy reform,
which began 25 years ago as a fringe phenomenon pushed by some debtor coun-
tries and a few academic sympathizers, has steadily moved into the academic and
policymaking mainstream. Although there continue to be substantial disagree-
ments on which approach is the best, the basic idea of applying domestic
bankruptcy reorganization to sovereigns is now supported by key representatives
of both the official creditor community and private creditors.44 The reason for this
new consensus appears to be a deep discontent with conventional tools for crisis
resolution—in particular, large-scale crisis lending—which is unlikely to go away.
In addition, very recently, there seems to have been a narrowing of positions on
how to reform sovereign bankruptcy. The main poles of the debate are now the
contractual approach proposed by Taylor (2002), who addresses the problem of
implementation incentives more explicitly than his predecessors, and Krueger
(2002), who dispenses with the notion that a statutory approach to sovereign
bankruptcy reorganization requires concentrating broad decision-making authority
in the hands of multilateral institutions. Judging from these developments, it
seems likely that the call for orderly workout procedures will have permanence,
and result in actual reforms in the foreseeable future.
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44As far as private creditors go, the Institute of International Finance has recently endorsed a “market-
based approach to restructuring sovereign debt,” which includes “broad-based use of collective action
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